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Abstract  
Significant empirical research has highlighted the existence of pork barrel politics. This is 
where public expenditure is targeted at particular regions based on the logic of collective 
action: political entrepreneurs maximize their chances of re-election by searching for and 
implementing programs or projects characterized by ‘concentrated benefits’ for key 
constituents and broadly dispersed costs. Using data on capital grants to Irish sports teams for 
1998–2015, this paper analyzes the extent to which an informal rule can correct this bias. The 
case of allocating sports capital grants is particularly interesting since academic research, media 
commentary, and ministerial statements all seem to confirm the existence of political bias with 
such allocations in Ireland. Specifically, the geographical distribution of the grants are clearly 
linked to the Minister for Sport: that minister’s constituent county receives significantly higher 
per capita grant allocation than any other county. The grants were suspended in 2009 because 
of a fiscal crisis arising from the recession. When the grants were restored in 2012, a new 
informal rule for allocations was introduced. That informal rule was introduced to reduce the 
extent of pork barrel politics by ensuring that no county received less than 75% or more than 
150% of the national average of the per capita grant allocations. The present study evaluated 
the effectiveness of that informal rule in reducing pork barrel politics in Irish sports capital 
grant allocations. 
 
Keywords:  Pork barrel; sport expenditure; fiscal rules; Congressional Dominance Model 
JEL Classification:  Z28; H5 
  
1. Introduction 
The study of what has become known as pork barrel politics, whereby public expenditure is 
targeted at specific regional areas based on political considerations—rather than economic or 
social needs (Young and Sobel 2013)—is a mainstay of political economy research. At least 
two mechanisms have been advanced to account for this phenomenon: they include politicians 
rewarding loyal constituents for voting for them, and enticing swing voters to support them 
(Leigh 2008). In this paper, we analyze whether pork barrel politics plays a role in the allocation 
of sports-related capital grants in the counties of Ireland. In addition, we examine whether an 
informal rule (introduced by politicians themselves following public criticisms of pork barrel 
politics) has curtailed the extent to which politics determines the allocations of those capital 
grants. 
 After the 1997 Irish general election, sport was included for the first time in the title of 
a government department, and responsibility for the allocation of sports capital grants fell to 
the Minister with responsibility for sport1. Over the next decade, the overall amount of funding 
followed the political cycle, peaking in election years and increasing continuously as the Irish 
economy experienced a period of rapid economic growth; however, a geographical bias was 
evident among the allocations, favouring the constituents of the sports minister and Minister 
for Finance (Considine et al. 2008). Subsequently, the situation changed. The impact of the 
international financial crisis of 2007–2008 was augmented in Ireland by the bursting of a 
domestic real estate bubble. There followed a fiscal crisis, a banking crisis, and Ireland entered 
a recovery program of the European Union and International Monetary Fund. Severe political 
consequences also followed as Fianna Fail2—the party that had dominated twentieth-century 
                                                          
1 Note that hereafter we referrer to the individual with responsibility for allocating sports capital grants as the 
sports minister.  The responsibility has fall under a number of different departments and to Ministers and 
Junior Ministers.  Therefore, for consistency throughout the remainder of the text these Ministers will be 
collectively referred to as the sports minister. 
2 The English translation of ‘Fianna Fail’ is ‘Soldiers of Destiny.’ 
Irish politics and been in government since 1997—suffered a heavy defeat in the general 
election of 2011: 70% of Fianna Fail’s elected representatives lost their seats. A key element 
in the opposition’s campaign in the 2011 election was political reform. 
 Owing to the fiscal crisis, annual capital grants to sports teams were suspended after 
the 2008 round of allocations and were not resumed until 2012. In 2011, Michael Ring was 
appointed sports minister, having responsibility for allocating sports capital grants. Reflecting 
the criticism directed at previous capital grant allocations—and possibly also the central role 
of political reform in the 2011 general election—a document entitled ‘2012 Sports Capital 
Programme—Assessment and Allocation Process’ was produced by the Department of 
Transport Tourism and Sport (2012). The document presented two alternatives for the 
distribution of sports capital grants. One method was to allocate funding ‘to each county on a 
pro-rata basis according to the 2011 census of population’. The second method, attributed to 
John Considine,3 was a proposal whereby ‘the funding to each constituency should be no more 
than one-and-a-half times the national average on a per capita basis’ (Department of Transport, 
Tourism and Sport 2012).  Minister Ring stated that ‘the Considine rule’4 should be applied so 
that no county (rather than constituency) would receive more than 150%, or less than 75%, of 
the per capita national average. The purpose of the present paper is to evaluate whether this 
informal rule for the allocation of capital grants made a significant difference in the 
geographical distribution of those grants. 
 This study uses data on the total capital grant allocations for sports facilities in all 26 
counties of Ireland (a map of Ireland’s counties appears in Appendix 1) over the period 1998–
2015. Using a random-effects panel data model to control for the impact of various explanatory 
variables as well as county-specific random effects, we examine whether the informal 
                                                          
3 Considine had previously published a number of pieces criticising the allocation of sports capital funding, 
notably Considine et al. (2004, 2008).  
4 This was how it was termed by the sports minister at the time. 
Considine rule had an impact on the sports minister’s decisions to allocate capital grants across 
Ireland. We found no significant relationship between the introduction of the Considine rule 
and the way in which grants were allocated; this suggests that the informal rule did not succeed 
in reducing bias with respect to the allocation of sports capital grants. This paper adds to the 
literature about the disproportional benefits from political institutions; however, the primary 
focus is the ineffectiveness of informal rules on public expenditure. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review 
of the relevant literature on pork barrel politics as well as of previous work about how pork 
barrel relates to sports capital grants in Ireland. The data used and preliminary analyzes of the 
data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the methodology we utilize to model the 
effect of the informal rule; the results of the analysis are presented in Section 5. The final 
section is the Conclusion. 
 
2. Research on pork, ‘sports pork’, and credit claiming 
The political considerations related to pork barrel politics tend to be classified in a number of 
ways. One classification addresses whether the voters in the target area are predominately core 
partisan supporters of the incumbent or whether swing voters in the area hold the balance of 
power. Spending can target political supporters in areas where they predominate: it is then a 
reward for core partisan supporters. Alternatively, the expenditure can target areas where the 
political outcome hangs in the balance: it is then an attempt to encourage swing voters to 
support those politicians responsible for the spending. Clemens et al. (2015) provide a good 
account of the literature on each classification; they also cover more recent work that 
incorporates the insights offered by both possible explanations. 
 Another approach focuses on the influences of the legislative and executive branches 
of the (US) government. Young and Sobel (2013) examine the allocation of US Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act spending using economic variables (Keynesian) and political variables 
(legislative and executive). In the congressional dominance model, the legislative branch is 
seen as influencing spending. This results in the activities of executive branch agencies being 
shaped by the policy preferences of Congress, especially those of the members of specialized 
oversight committees. In this way, spending is more closely identified with specific politicians. 
Young and Sobel (2013) find empirical support for this model. Hall et al. (2015) list the more 
prominent contributions to the literature that support the predictions of the congressional 
dominance model. Those authors then proceed to show how congressional oversight plays an 
important role in the funding received by a congressional district under the Essential Air 
Services program; this was designed to mitigate temporarily the impact of the 1978 Airline 
Deregulation Act. Hall et al. (2015, p. 148) note, ‘When the political structure of the bureau 
system interacts with the institutional structure of geographically based political districts, the 
result is geographically based benefits disproportionate to what would be expected based on a 
public interest reading of the bureau’s activities’.  
 Pork barrel explanations also feature prominently in the literature on US sport; 
however, the emphasis has tended to be on city, rather than state or national, expenditure. Some 
of the more important early works were published by think tanks in Washington (Noll and 
Zimbalist 1997; Keating 1999). Unsurprisingly, those publications and others drew heavily on 
the relationship between sport and politics in the United States (e.g., Siegfried and Zimbalist 
2000; Long 2005). The main theme in this literature has been how major professional sports 
leagues extorted money from cities by manipulating the supply of teams. The ineffectiveness 
of these subsidies in promoting urban development is illustrated in Coates and Humphreys 
(2003) and Coates (2007).  
 In Ireland, the final decision on the allocation of sports grants is made by the sports 
minister. The sports minister is nominated by the Taoiseach (prime minister) and approved by 
the government from elected members of parliament. Members of parliament are elected to 
represent their constituency in a general election. Prior to the general election of 2011, when a 
new government entered power, there was substantial criticism of various sports ministers and 
their engagement in pork barrel politics. Suiter and O’Malley (2014a, b) examined if Irish sport 
expenditure for the period 2002–2007 was directed towards government-dominated 
constituencies, marginal constituencies, and the constituency of the decision-making minister. 
They found that resources were directed towards the constituency of the ministers making the 
decision and that the constituency of the sports minister obtained significantly more funding—
as did the minister who decided how much funding was to be given to sport, i.e., the Minister 
for Finance. Suiter and O’Malley attributed this finding to the fact that there is greater 
discretionary power in the allocation of sports grants. The findings of Suiter and O’Malley 
(2014a,b) are in line with those of Considine et al. (2004, 2008), who presented evidence 
suggesting the existence of pork barrel politics in allocating sports capital grants in Ireland. 
Considine et al. (2008) suggested that a rule should be put in place (the Considine rule) to limit 
the bias in the funding. 
 By the time the recession stopped Irish sports capital grant allocations in 2009, the 
allocations were widely seen as ‘sports pork’. Before the grants were reintroduced in 2012, 
ministers and government officials discussed the possibility of a criterion for distributing the 
grants among the counties. Reflecting the criticism directed at previous sports capital grant 
allocations—and possibly the central role of political reform in the 2011 General Election—a 
document titled “2012 Sports Capital Programme—Assessment and Allocation Process” was 
circulated (Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport, 2012). The document proposed an 
equal per capita distribution among the counties for those grants. The alternative offered to 
politicians by those officials was based on the research and media coverage of Considine et al. 
(2008); the sports minister agreed that it ‘should use the Considine rule’ (Department of 
Transport, Tourism and Sport 2012).  The Considine rule was defined so that no county would 
receive more than 150%, or less than 75%, of the per capita national average sports grant 
allocation. The rule was informal and was not originally made public. It only came to light after 
the state broadcaster (RTE) made a Freedom of Information request. The sections below 
examine whether this informal rule made a difference to the bias in sports capital funding. 
 
3. Data and preliminary analysis 
3.1 Data sources 
The data utilized in this study are derived from a number of sources: a complete list of the 
variables is presented in Table 1. All variables are measured at the county level, of which there 
are 26 in Ireland, and for the period from 1998 to 2015. Appendix 1 presents a county map of 
Ireland. 
 The key variable of interest to us was the per capita sports capital grant allocations to 
Ireland’s counties; we downloaded these data from the website of the Department of Transport, 
Tourism and Sport. Two points should be noted here. First, the data refer to sports capital grant 
allocations rather than actual payments. The allocations are promises made to sporting 
organizations based on their applications. Those allocations are readily identified with the 
minister who announces them. Moreover, there may be a considerable gap between the time of 
the promised allocation and when the club receives payment. For example, after the February 
2016 general election, Minister Ring was no longer the sports minister yet many of the grants 
allocated in 2015 are yet to be drawn down.  
 The second point to note is that the data related to our dependant variable are based on 
counties, not political constituencies. Sports capital grant allocations are made on a county-by-
county basis, and the allocations are made by county groupings. No breakdown of the grants 
on a constituency basis was available for the full period of our study. In Ireland, political 
constituencies are based on county boundaries; however, the fit is not exact. Therefore, when 
using county grouping, any political bias is likely to be understated. We believe it appropriate 
to use county data in evaluating the Considine rule because in official discussion of the rule, it 
was noted by government officials that the data and applications were not decomposed by 
constituency. 
 We derived the data for our independent variables from a number of sources. We 
obtained data relating to population and unemployment from the Irish censuses of 1996, 2002, 
2006, and 2011. Therefore, the population and unemployment data, unlike the per capita sports 
capital grant data, are not truly annual but have limited variability across time. For 1998–2001, 
we used the 1996 census data; for 2002–2005, we used the 2002 census data; and so on. We 
created a series of dummy variables indicating whether the Taoiseach (prime minister), 
Tánaiste (deputy prime minister), sport minister, or Minister for Finance were from a particular 
county or not. Those variables took a value of 1 if the individual was from county i in period t 
(where i=1…26 and t=1998…2015), or 0 otherwise. This allowed us to isolate the impact that 
a particular political office holder might have on the per capita allocation of sports capital 
grants to their constituent county.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
 
 
3.2 Preliminary analysis 
In this section, we present a preliminary analysis of our data. We began by considering the 
spread of the per capita grant data among the counties during three periods: 1998–2002; 2003–
2007; and 2012–2015. The rationale for this choice is that they cover the periods of the three 
longest-serving sports ministers and cover all but 1 year of grants.5 Figure 1 shows the 
allocation of funding throughout Ireland during these periods (with each period normalised to 
100, the national average). It is notable during the period 1998–2002 Jim McDaid was Minister 
for Tourism, Sport and Recreation; he was elected by voters from the county of Donegal. For 
2003–2007, John O’Donoghue was Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism; he was elected by 
voters from Kerry. From 2011, Michael Ring was the (junior) minister with responsibility for 
sport allocations; he was elected by voters from Mayo. Those counties appear on the map of 
Ireland in Appendix 1. We can note that in the period each Teachta Dála6 (TD) served as sports 
minister, the per capita grants to their county were amongst the highest in the country. This is 
consistent for each period. 
 A more formal analysis of the grant applications is presented as a series of box plots in 
Figure 2. The box plots confirm that Donegal, Kerry, and Mayo are outliers in the three periods. 
Interestingly, in the 1998–2002 period, Kildare was also identified as an outlier, when the 
Minister for Finance represented that county. In the 2012–2015 period, Leitrim and Carlow 
were identified as outliers. This may be due to their relatively small populations combined with 
a few relatively large grants. We note that there are no outliers in the lower half of the 
distribution: this suggests that sport capital grants in Ireland appear to suffer from outliers at 
the upper end of the allocations spectrum (i.e. some counties receive more than would be 
anticipated) rather than the lower end. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
                                                          
5 For the period around 2008, Martin Cullen was sports minister; he was elected by the people of Waterford. 
That county was fifth in per capita funding for 1998–2007; it was sixth in 2008. 
6 The English translation of this is Deputy to the Dáil, where the Dáil refers to Dáil Éireann, the lower house of 
the Oireachtas (the Irish Parliament). It is the equivalent of terms such as Member of Parliament (MP) in the 
United Kingdom. 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
4. Methodology 
The methodology we employed was a random-effects panel estimation. Specifically, we related 
a variety of factors that may have affected the per capita grant allocation a county received 
from 1998 to 2015. The model to be estimated is presented as Eq. (1): 
 
ittitititititit ZOMSMCRMSGRANT εαααααα ++++++= 43210 *   (1) 
 
where itGRANT  is the natural logarithm of the allocated per capita sports grants received by 
county i in period t; 0α  is the constant term; itMS  is an (N*T)*1 vector, consisting of a dummy 
variable indicating whether the sports minister was based in county i in period t; 1α  is the 
associated coefficient. It was anticipated that 1α  would be significant and positive; that would 
indicate that the sports minister allocated greater funding to their constituent county ceteris 
paribus. itCR  is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the Considine rule was 
implemented (post-2012), and 0 otherwise. Therefore, itit SMCR *  can be thought of as an 
interaction term, showing the impact of the Considine rule on the grant allocation decisions of 
the sports minister. 2α  is the associated coefficient. Therefore, the coefficient 1α  shows the 
impact of the sports minister being from county i on the grants received by county i; the 
coefficient 2α  indicates whether this effect changed following the introduction of the 
Considine rule in 2012. If 2α  is significant and negative, this implies that the Considine rule 
has resulted in reducing the sports minister’s ( 1α ) bias; if 2α  is significant and positive, this 
means that it has increased the 1α  bias; and if it is insignificant, this indicates that the 
introduction of the Considine rule has had no statistical effect on the 1α  bias. 
 Regarding the remainder of our model, itOM  is an (N*T)*3 matrix of dummy 
variables, representing whether county i had one of three possible other senior ministers in 
period t. The three other senior ministers considered are the Taoiseach, Tánaiste, and Minister 
for Finance. 3α  is the 3*1 vector of coefficients. itZ  is an (N*T)*k matrix of k control variables 
(a full list of variables appears in Table 1) that may affect the level of grants received by county 
i in period t, with 4α  as the associated k*1 vector of coefficients.  tα  is a series of time dummy 
variables controlling for year-specific effects. itε  is the error term. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
The results of our analysis appear in Table 2. We present four alternative regression 
estimations. The first column is the estimation of Eq. (1) without the interaction term for the 
Considine rule; the second is an estimation of Eq. (1) incorporating the Considine rule.  Both 
these estimations use the natural logarithm of the euro value of grant allocations per capita as 
the dependent variable. The third and fourth columns employ the value of grants per capita as 
a percentage of the national average as the dependent variable. We present the alternative 
measures to demonstrate that the results are robust to different specifications of our dependent 
variable. 
 With all estimations, we observed a significant, positive coefficient on our sports 
minister dummy variable. This suggests that the sports minister will allocate a higher level of 
per capita grants to their constituent county ceteris paribus. Since the dependent variable 
(grants per capita) is expressed as a natural logarithm, we can interpret the coefficient on the 
sports minister dummy variable as a semi-elasticity. This suggests that on average, the sports 
minister allocates to their county 121% more per capita in grants than to other counties. 
 With our interaction variable, which indicates the impact of the Considine rule on the 
sports minister’s grant allocation decision, it is evident that this is statistically insignificant. 
The insignificance of this interaction term indicates that the introduction of the Considine rule 
did not affect the grant allocation. Therefore, the 121% bias (on average), identified earlier, 
persists after 2012.  
 Regarding our other minister dummies, we find a significant positive effect for the 
Minister for Finance. This is consistent with the results of Suiter and O’Malley (2014a, b) and 
Considine et al. (2008), who highlighted the significant role of the Minister for Finance. Our 
remaining controls indicate that larger counties did not receive higher or lower levels of grant 
allocations. Likewise, we did not observe a city effect.  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
One possibility for the statistical insignificance of the Considine rule is the way it was 
interpreted and implemented. After the 2012 round of allocations, grant allocations have been 
classified in various ways.  They have appeared as ‘local grants’, ‘non-local grants’, ‘special 
grants’, and ‘other grants’. For example, in the 2015 round, which was the last before Minister 
Ring left office, two grants totalling just under 4 million euros were classified as ‘Other’. Both 
were allocated to the minister’s constituent county of Mayo. Some statements by Minister Ring 
suggest that he applied the Considine rule only to local grant allocations. In a parliamentary 
debate on 15 May 2014, Minister Ring made the following statement: 
 
“When the most recent round of funding [2012] under the sports capital programme 
was announced, journalists immediately tried to find out if County Mayo had 
received a greater allocation than other counties. The county was allocated, pro 
rata, the amount to which it was entitled, as were all other counties. I did what Dr 
John Considine wanted me to do and when he found no reason to criticise the local 
schemes, he examined the regional schemes.”7 
 
However, other statements made by Minister Ring suggest otherwise. In another parliamentary 
debate on the Sport Ireland Bill 2014 on 24 September 2014, Minister Ring requested that the 
opposition spokesperson might give him ‘credit for the per capita grant … Even Professor 
Considine approved of it’. There was then no mention of local, non-local, regional, or other 
grants. 
 Figure 3 provides some evidence to suggest that Minister Ring applied the Considine 
rule only to ‘local’ grant allocations. The figure shows that all 26 counties come within 75%–
150% of the national average. Figure 3 also shows a number of counties receiving higher per 
capita grants than Mayo. However, one could argue that the publication of grant allocations 
with those local, non-local, special, and other classifications suited Minister Ring. When all 
sports capital grants (local, non-local, special, and other classifications) are combined, Mayo 
(Minister Ring’s constituent county) maintains the highest per capita allocation and exceeds 
the 150% national average threshold. The reasons for the classifications have not been 
adequately explained. One could then argue that the informal Considine rule succeeded only 
in reducing the transparency of the grant process and that there was little change in the actual 
political bias. 
 
                                                          
7 The opposition spokesperson made the response, ‘That was where the Minister was found out.’ 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
There is no statistical evidence to suggest that the Considine rule succeeded in reducing the 
bias in the sports capital grant allocations to Ireland’s counties. Our results support previous 
findings whereby the county represented by the sports minister is a significant explanatory 
variable in the allocation of those grants. Previous studies have also indicated that the county 
represented by the Minister for Finance received statistically significant more per capita than 
might otherwise be expected. Our evidence supports this finding. 
 One possible impact of the Considine rule is that it may have resulted in decomposition 
in the classification of the allocations. During Minister Ring’s period in office, the allocations 
were published under four distinct headings. Some ministerial statements suggest that Minister 
Ring interpreted the Considine rule as applying only to ‘local’ allocations. However, other 
ministerial statements appear to contradict this view. Figure 3 indicates that the Considine rule 
was interpreted to apply only to local grants. However, there are two problems with this 
interpretation. First, the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport (2012) documentation 
shows no reference to the Considine rule applying only to local allocations. Second, another 
allocation criterion—outlined by Minister Ring in a radio interview in December 2012 and 
supported by data in a press release of the previous day—involved the minister rebalancing the 
previous allocations. Those allocations were not decomposed into ‘local’, ‘non-local’, 
‘special’, and ‘other’. It is in the latter three categories that Mayo received allocations greater 
than might otherwise have been expected. 
Our results suggest that the informal Considine rule failed to reduce the extent to which 
Irish sport capital grants are used as sports pork.  
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Appendix 1: Map of Irish counties 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
 
 
    
 
Variable Name Description Source Unit of Measurement 
Dependent Variable    
   ln Grant per Capita The natural logarithm of the € value of grants per 
capita 
Grant data: Department of Transport, Tourism 
and Sport website. 
€ natural logarithm 
    
Decision Rule    
   Taoiseach (PM) Is this the Taoiseach’s constituency. Various Sources 1/0 dummy variable 
   Tánaiste (Deputy PM) Is this the Tánaiste’s constituency. Various Sources 1/0 dummy variable 
   Sports Minister Is this the Sports Minister’s constituency. Various Sources 1/0 dummy variable 
   Finance Minister Is this the Finance Minister’s constituency. Various Sources 1/0 dummy variable 
    
Control Variables    
   ln Population The natural logarithm of the population of the 
county. 
Irish Census of Population 1998; 2002; 2006; 
2011 
natural logarithm of 
number of people. 
    ln Unemployment The natural logarithm of the number of people 
looking for work in the county. 
Irish Census of Population 1998; 2002; 2006; 
2011 
natural logarithm of 
number of people. 
    
Informal Rule    
   Considine Rule A dummy variable taking the value of 1 post-2012 
when the Considine rule was adopted. 
Na 1/0 dummy variable 
Sports Minister 
*Considine Rule 
An interaction term showing the effect of the 
Considine rule interacted with the Sports minister 
Na 1/0 dummy variable 
    
21 
 
Table 2: Random Effects Estimation of Equation (1) 
 
Variables 
Nat. Log of Grant 
per Capita 
Nat. Log of Grant 
per Capita 
Per Capita Grant 
Relative to 
National Average  
Per Capita Grant 
Relative to 
National Average  
City -0.060 -0.063 0.995 1.338 
 (0.317) (0.318) (22.323) (22.264) 
Nat. Log of Unemp 0.411 0.405 -1.485 -0.569 
 (0.476) (0.484) (27.559) (27.266) 
Nat. Log of Pop -0.250 -0.245 5.884 5.063 
 (0.534) (0.540) (38.046) (37.798) 
Taoiseach  -0.022 0.034 -25.697 -34.906 
 (1.051) (1.304) (37.588) (41.061) 
Tanaiste  0.875 0.847 32.718 37.299 
 (0.662) (0.766) (24.183) (25.498) 
Sport 1.217** 1.259** 102.247*** 95.477*** 
 (0.579) (0.506) (30.440) (34.496) 
Finance 1.347* 1.352** 68.871 68.066 
 (0.692) (0.682) (45.499) (45.475) 
Sport*Considine Rule  -0.256  42.187 
  (1.175)  (53.160) 
Constant -1.471 -1.485 34.288 36.575 
 (3.172) (3.179) (210.834) (210.130) 
N  468 468 468 468 
R2 (Overall) 0.77 0.77 0.04 0.04 
Chi2 24,364.39 28,549.08 234.95 157,038.22 
Note 1: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. 
Note 2: Data based on 26 counties and 1998 to 2015. 
Note 3: Year dummies are included in the estimation but not presented in the table due to space 
constraints.  To summarize their effect the coefficients show increasing allocations between 1998 and 
2008, decreasing allocations between 2009 and 2012 and increasing allocations following 2012. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Per Capita Sports Capital Grants by County (select time periods) 
1998-2002 2003-2007 2012-2015 
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Figure 2: Box Plot of Per Capita Sport Capital Grant Allocations 
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Figure 3: County Per Capita Sports Capital Local Grant Allocations Relative to 
National Average, 2012-15, National Average = 100. 
 
 
 
